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Abstract
We study the problem of uncertainty sharing within a household: “risk sharing,” in a
context of Knightian uncertainty. A household shares uncertain prospects using a social
welfare function. We characterize the social welfare functions such that the household is
collectively less averse to uncertainty than each member, and satisfies the Pareto principle
and an independence axiom. We single out the sum of certainty equivalents as the unique
member of this family which provides quasiconcave rankings over risk-free allocations.
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1 Introduction
We study when a household of uncertainty-averse individuals will behave in the aggregate
in a fashion that is less averse to uncertainty than each member of the household.1 The
notion that a group is less uncertainty averse than its members is a very familiar one
in economics. Early arguments for the notion are in Samuelson (1964), Vickrey (1964)
and Arrow and Lind (1970). We characterize the households that collectively are less
uncertainty averse than its members.
We consider a household of individuals who collectively face some aggregate sub-
jective uncertainty in the consumption of a single good, say money. Members of the
household have differing attitudes toward uncertainty. The household seeks to allocate
the uncertainty to its members to maximize some notion of social welfare.
Our main results can be roughly stated as follows: Suppose that the household ranks
allocations using a social welfare function 0 (1, . . . n), which depends on individual
preferences i. The sum of individual certainty equivalents represents the only social
welfare function (SWF) that
1. generates less uncertainty averse households (for all individual preference profiles);
2. ignores preferences over uncertainty whenever it compares uncertainty-free
prospects;
∗We thank David Ahn for comments, and SangMok Lee for excellent research assistance. Our research
was supported by the National Science Foundation through grant SES-0751980.
1We use “household” throughout to refer generically to a group of agents engaged in an uncertainty
sharing arrangement.
3. is quasiconcave over uncertainty-free prospects.
This result is a simple consequence of a theorem stating that (1) and (2) are equivalent
to ranking allocations with a function which takes as input certainty equivalents, and
when maximized over a simplex, has a solution at every corner. This theorem, in turn,
uses some classical results on aggregation from demand theory (concretely Samuelson
(1956) and Chipman and Moore (1979)).
The sum of certainty equivalents has a simple economic interpretation: it is the certain
monetary sum that the household would demand to accept an allocation of uncertain
prospects. In other words, it is the collective willingness to pay for an allocation. Myerson
(2004), for example, recommends MBAs and applied decision makers use the sum of
certainty equivalents to share risk. Our paper is a justification for this type of normative
recommendation.
In the specialized setting of homothetic preference profiles (such as CRRA prefer-
ences), we find another justification for the sum of certainty equivalents criterion. It
yields the most uncertainty averse convex household preference, among those which are
less uncertainty averse than members’ preferences.
We proceed to discuss our results in more detail.
We suppose a finite set of states of the world. Agents’ preferences are over state-
contingent monetary payoffs, which we call acts. We impose little structure on the
preferences of agents; in particular, agents may not be subjective expected utility maxi-
mizers. We assume that preferences are convex–if two acts are deemed indifferent, then
any convex combination of the two is at least as good as each of them. Intuitively,
the convex combination of the two acts represents a hedge against uncertainty and thus
improves the individual’s welfare.
A SWF recommends a preference over allocations for any given list of individual
preferences. We impose the Pareto principle: the SWF must be monotone increasing in
the welfare of individuals.
We present two new axioms. The first axiom is an independence axiom: the ranking
of any two allocations which involve no uncertainty should be independent of the agents’
uncertainty preferences. An allocation involves no uncertainty when each agent is allo-
2
cated a constant act–an act whose payoff does not depend on the state. Note that acts
involve monetary payoffs; hence comparing two allocations free of uncertainty simply
involves a tradeoff in which agents receive more or less money. The axiom states that the
tradeoff should be resolved without regard for the agents’ preferences over uncertainty.
Our final and main axiom is reduction of uncertainty aversion. It says that the
household is less averse to uncertainty than its members. The axiom requires defining
a comparative notion of uncertainty aversion. Following Yaari (1969), we say that a
preference 1 is less uncertainty averse than 2 if, for every constant act c and every act
x, when x 2 c then x 1 c. The idea is that if the uncertainty involved in choosing the
uncertain act x over the certain act c is acceptable for 2, then it must also be acceptable
for 1. For two subjective expected utility agents with the same prior beliefs, one agent
is more uncertainty averse than the other if and only if he is more risk averse than the
other.
The social welfare function guides the household’s decisions on how to share uncertain
prospects. In a classic paper discussing the representative consumer problem in demand
theory, Samuelson (1956) shows that a household which allocates aggregate bundles opti-
mally according to some SWF behaves as if it is an individual (that is, it has a complete
and transitive preference). Our social welfare function generates such a preference for
each list of individual preferences–this is what we call the household preference. Our
main axiom requires that this household preference be less uncertainty averse than the
preferences of each member of the household.
We characterize completely the family of all SWF’s satisfying these properties. The
simplest member of the family to explain is the unique one which is quasiconcave over
uncertainty-free prospects. Under this assumption, the unique SWF satisfying the axioms
is representable by the function, which for any allocation, returns the sum of certainty
equivalents. That is, for each individual’s state-contingent consumption, the rule finds
the certain amount that the individual would need to be given in compensation, then
adds these across individuals.
Section 2 provides the model; Section 3 has the main results; Section 4 presents results
for homothetic preferences, and examples of familiar special cases. Section 5 provides
discussion and related literature.
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2 The model
Let Ω be a finite set of states of the world. Acts are payoff-contingent elements of R+;
that is, the set of acts is X = RΩ+. Let N be a finite set of agents. An allocation is an
element of XN . An allocation of x ∈ X is a vector (xi)i∈N ∈ XN for which
∑
i∈N xi = x.
A preference relation  is a complete, transitive, convex, continuous, and monotonic2
binary relation on X. The set of preferences is denoted R. Convexity captures the
property of uncertainty aversion, as first formulated by Yaari (1969).
Our aim in this study is to understand methods of aggregating preferences which
reduce uncertainty aversion. We imagine a set of agents who reside in a household and use
some social welfare function to optimally distribute resources. Samuelson (1956) observed
that such optimization leads to “rational” behavior in the aggregate. We ask when such
household behavior is less uncertainty averse than the behavior of each individual in the
household.
To this end, we discuss a comparative notion of uncertainty aversion and a domain of
preferences on which this exercise becomes meaningful. For c ∈ R+, we abuse notation
and identify c with the constant act whose outcome in every state is c. Let ′ and  be
two preference relations. As in Yaari (1969), we say that is more uncertainty averse
than ′ if for all c ≥ 0, {x : x  c} ⊆ {x : x ′ c}. Every uncertain prospect which is
preferable to c by  is also preferable to c by ′.
The idea that a household should be less uncertainty averse than its members has
both normative and strategic content. For example, often in strategic interaction, all else
equal, an agent who is less uncertainty averse will fare better according to all preferences.
This is the case in Nash bargaining Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992), as well as in
many other game theoretic models of bargaining. By sharing uncertainty appropriately,
a household seeks to become more “competitive.” Secondly, it is somehow understood
that risk neutral preferences (linear preferences) are an “ideal” preference that should be
strived for–models of asset pricing and finance for example deal only with the expected
values of assets and not their expected utilities.
For any ∈ R, define the set of priors at constant act c by P (, c) =
2That is, if x (ω) > y (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, then x  y.
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{p ∈ ∆ (Ω) : x  c =⇒ p · x ≥ p · c}. The set of priors is
P () =
⋂
c≥0
P (, c) .
Thus, a prior at c is a probability measure over Ω such that the expectation of x dominates
c; in demand theory terms, it simply represents the marginal rate of substitution given
certain consumption c. A profile (i)i∈N is a common prior profile at c if⋂
i∈N
P (i, c) 6= ∅.
Common priors have no normative content in our work. The main point here is to
uncover conditions which force a household to have less uncertainty aversion than each
of its members. A necessary and sufficient condition for a preference to exist which is
less uncertainty averse than each individual preference ((i))i∈N is that for all c there be
some common prior at c.
We consider the stronger requirement that there be a common prior for all individuals
which is a common prior at any constant act. That is, we work with the profiles ((i))i∈N
with ⋂
i∈N
P (i) 6= ∅.
We denote the resulting set of profiles by CP . Subjective expected utility profiles with a
common prior are in CP , as are many other examples.
A domain D is a subset of RN . A social welfare function is a mapping which carries D
into binary relations over XN . Formally, we denote the set of binary relations over XN by
RN . Then a social welfare function is a function 0: D → RN . We write 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
for the binary relation over allocations obtained when individual preferences are (i)i∈N .
Example 1: A classical domain of preferences is the domain of risk averse expected
utility profiles with a common prior. We denote this domain by EU . Formally, (i)i∈N ∈
EU if there exists p ∈ ∆ (Ω) and for all i ∈ N , there exists ui : R+ → R which is strictly
increasing, concave, and continuous for which for all i ∈ N and all x, y ∈ X, x i y if
and only if ∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω)ui (x (ω)) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω)ui (y (ω)) .
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A standard example of a social welfare function 0: EU → RN used in the theory of
risk sharing (for example, Borch (1962) and Wilson (1968)) is the utilitarian rule. For
any (i)i∈N ∈ EU , there exists for all i ∈ N a unique ui : R+ → R which represents
i and which is normalized so that ui (0) = 0 and ui (1) = 1. We then require
(x1, ..., xn) 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
(y1, ..., yn) if and only if∑
i∈N
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω)ui (xi (ω)) ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω)ui (yi (ω)) .
Note that, while we have restricted elements of R significantly, elements of RN obey
no restrictions whatsoever (we will later make assumptions on these elements in the form
of axioms). This is because elements of R are understood to be descriptive, whereas
elements of RN are normative recommendations for a society.
3 Results
We proceed to describe the four axioms. The axioms will be equivalent to a certain class
of SWF. Coupled with quasiconcavity over uncertainty-free prospects, we characterize
the SWF which is represented as the sum of certainty equivalents.
Our first axiom states that household preferences over allocations should be minimally
“rational.”
Rationality: For all (i)i∈N ∈ D, 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
is continuous, monotonic, com-
plete, and transitive.
Our second axiom is natural and requires that the SWF comply with the Pareto
property.
Pareto: For all (i)i∈N ∈ RN and all (xi)i∈N , (yi)i∈N ∈ XN , if xi i yi for all
i ∈ N , then x 0 ((i)i∈N) y (with strict preference if all individual preferences are
strict).
Our next axiom is the first that deals specifically with the interpretation of uncer-
tainty. It requires that in ranking profiles of certain prospects, the social welfare function
should ignore attitudes toward uncertainty. We often refer to the axiom simply as inde-
pendence.
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Independence of uncertainty attitudes for constant acts: For all
(i)i∈N , (′i)i∈N ∈ D and all constant (ci)i∈N , (di)i∈N ∈ XN , (ci)i∈N 0(
(i)i∈N
)
(di)i∈N ⇐⇒ (ci)i∈N 0
(
(′i)i∈N
)
(di)i∈N .
Acts are monetary lotteries, and individual preferences are monotonic, so all individ-
ual preferences coincide over constant act: more is better. The independence axiom says
that, when comparing constant acts, 0 should not depend on individual preferences as
these do not differ in the comparison of constant acts.
To understand our last axiom, we need to discuss the notion of uncertainty sharing. It
is the standard notion of risk sharing, in an environment of possibly non-expected-utility
maximizers (see e.g. Epstein (2001) and Rigotti and Shannon (2005)).
The individuals in N are all members of a household. Household members entertain
different attitudes toward uncertainty. We imagine that the household uses a SWF to
allocate an aggregate bundle x among its members. That is, given household preferences
(i)i∈N by maximizing 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
across
{
(xi)i∈N ∈ XN :
∑
i∈N xi ≤ x
}
. Under our
continuity assumptions, this uncertainty-sharing maximization problem is well-defined.
Uncertainty sharing generates a well-defined household preference over acts: an “ag-
gregate preference.” This aggregation results from a well-known aggregation result in
classical demand theory (see Samuelson (1956) and Chipman and Moore (1979)).
Household preferences over acts are given by x ∗ ((i)i∈N) y if and only if for all
(yi)i∈N ∈ XN such that
∑
i∈N yi ≤ y, there exists (xi)i∈N such that
∑
i∈N xi ≤ x and
(xi)i∈N 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
(yi)i∈N . This binary relation is the household preference.
We are now ready to state our next axiom.
Reduction of uncertainty aversion: For all (i)i∈N ∈ D, ∗
(
(i)i∈N
)
is less
uncertainty averse than i for all i ∈ N .
Example 2: Suppose D = EU and consider the utilitarian rule defined above. In gen-
eral, for any (i)i∈N ∈ EU , the household preference ∗
(
(i)i∈N
)
is expected utility
with von Neumann Morgenstern utility index given by
u (x) = supP
i∈N xi=x
∑
i∈N
ui (xi) .
The function u is referred to as the “sup-convolution” of the functions ui . It is eas-
ily verified that the resulting ∗ may be less or more risk averse than the individual
preferences.
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U¯1
x(1)
U¯2
U¯2
U¯1
x(2)
(a) Preference 1 is less uncertainty
averse than 2.
U¯1
U¯2
U¯2
x(1)
U¯1
x(2)
(b) Household preference must
contain lower envelope of U¯1 − U¯1
and U¯2 − U¯2.
Figure 1: Comparisons in uncertainty aversion.
In general, there may not exist a binary relation which is less uncertainty averse than
a profile of binary relations. But they exist for profiles in D ⊆ CP .
Figure 1 presents the problem geometrically. One preference 1 is less uncertainty
averse than 2 if, when we compare their upper contour sets through any uncertainty-
free act, the upper contour set of 1 contains that of 2. Figure 1(a) illustrates how the
preferences having the U¯1−U¯1 indifference curve are less averse to uncertainty than those
having the U¯2 − U¯2 curve. Note that there is a common prior, indicated by the tangent
line. In Figure 1(a), any household preference satisfying the reduction of uncertainty
aversion axiom will need to have indifference curves “below” U¯1 − U¯1.
Figure 1(b) presents a case where the preferences do not have comparable uncer-
tainty aversion. In the figure, the most uncertainty averse household preference which
is less uncertainty averse than each individual agent is given by the lower envelope of
the two indifference curves (i.e. by the curve which goes from U¯1 to the intersection of
the two indifference curves, then coincides with U¯2 − U¯2 until the second intersection,
then coincides with U¯1− U¯1). Note that this household preference is not convex, and any
household preference satisfying reduction in uncertainty aversion must have indifference
curves below this lower envelope of U¯1 − U¯1 and U¯2 − U¯2.
For a preference ∈ R, the certainty equivalent ce : X → R carries each act x
to the constant act c for which c ∼ x. By our continuity and monotonicity assumptions,
certainty equivalents exist and are unique. Critically for us, for a given , ce is a
continuous utility representation of . The following is immediate. We say a function
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W : RN+ → R is strictly monotonic if x, y ∈ RN+ and x ≥ y implies W (x) ≥ W (y), and
x y (xi > yi for all i ∈ N) implies W (x) > W (y).
Remark 1 For two preferences ,′∈ R,  is more uncertainty averse than ′ if and
only if for all x ∈ X, ce (x) ≤ ce′ (x).
Proposition 3: A social welfare function on D satisfies rationality, Pareto, and
independence if and only if there exists a strictly monotonic, continuous function
W : RN+ → R for which for all (i)i∈N ∈ RN and all (xi)N , (yi)N ∈ XN ,
(xi) 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
(yi)⇐⇒ W ((cei (xi))) ≥ W ((cei (yi))) .
Proof: Let (′i)i∈N ∈ D. Define W : RN → R so that W
(
(di)i∈N
) ≥ W ((ci)i∈N) if
and only if
(di)i∈N 0
(
(′i)i∈N
)
(ci)i∈N .
W is well-defined as 0 ((′i)i∈N) is continuous (Debreu, 1964). W is strictly
monotonic by the Pareto property. Now, let (i)i∈N ∈ RN be arbitrary. Let
x, y ∈ XN . Then by Pareto and rationality, (xi) 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
(yi) if and only
if (cei (xi))i∈N 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
(cei (yi))i∈N . By independence (cei (xi))i∈N 0(
(i)i∈N
)
(cei (yi))i∈N if and only if (cei (xi))i∈N 0
(
(′i)i∈N
)
(cei (yi))i∈N . Again by
definition, (cei (xi))i∈N 0
(
(′i)i∈N
)
(cei (yi))i∈N if and only if W
(
(cei (xi))i∈N
) ≥
W
(
(cei (yi))i∈N
)
. 
Our aim from this point on is to characterize those functions W which reduce uncer-
tainty aversion.
Example 4: The simplest example of a W which reduces uncertainty aversion is given
by
W (t1, ..., tn) = max
i∈N
{ti} .
This function illustrates some of the properties of the reduction of uncertainty aversion.
While it is true that the household rule generated by this function reduces uncertainty
aversion on the domain CP , the function W generates a very unfair rule. Moreover,
the induced household preferences are typically not convex. If we denote by Ui (c) the
upper contour set of i at c, then it is easily verified that U∗ (c) =
⋃
i∈N
Ui (c) (this also
verifies that this household preference is the most uncertainty averse preference which
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is less uncertainty averse than each individual in the household). In general, household
preferences induced by maximal household welfare need not be convex. Thus, even if
every individual in the household is uncertainty averse, the household need not be.
The following proposition illustrates that for any preference profile in CP , any prior
which is common to all agents is also a household prior. It holds because under the
assumption CP , constant allocations are always efficient, and constant allocations are
always supported by the common prior. The intuition for the result is similar to results
appearing in Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000), Dana (2002) and Rigotti,
Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008).
The c-simplex ∆c =
{
u ∈ RN+ :
∑
N ui = c
}
is the set of nonnegative vectors summing
to c.
Proposition 5: Suppose that the conditions in Proposition 3 are satisfied. Let
(i)i∈N ∈ CP ∩ D and suppose that the function W associated with 0 is strictly
increasing. Then
⋂
i∈N
P (i) ⊆ P
(∗ ((i)i∈N)).
Proof: Let c be a constant act.
First, we show that constant allocations of c maximize 0 ((i)i∈N) across all alloca-
tions of c. Observe that for a constant act di, cei (di) = di. Consequently, the constant
allocation (di)i∈N maps to (cei (di))i∈N = (di)i∈N , so that any vector on ∆c is a vector
of certainty equivalents for some constant allocation of c.
Now, let (yi) be an allocation such that
∑
i∈N yi = c. Note that, treating a certainty
equivalent as a constant act, p ·cei (yi) ≤ p ·yi, as cei (yi) ∼i yi and p ∈ P (i, cei(yi)).
Conclude that ∑
i∈N
cei (yi) =
∑
i∈N
p · cei (yi)
≤
∑
i∈N
p · yi
= p · c
= c.
Consequently, (cei (yi))i∈N lies below the ∆c simplex, so there always exists a con-
stant allocation (di)i∈N maximizing 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
across all allocations of c.
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ce1
ce2
∆c
˘
(t1, t2) : W (t1, t2) = W¯
¯
Figure 2: Level curves of W in the hypotheses of Theorem 6.
Secondly, let p ∈
⋂
i∈N
P (i); we shall prove that p ∈ P
(∗ ((i)i∈N)). Let x ∗(
(i)i∈N
)
c. Let (xi)i∈N solve maxW
(
(cei (xi))i∈N
)
subject to
∑
xi = x. Then by
definition of ∗ ((i)i∈N), for all constant allocations (di)i∈N of c, W ((cei (xi))i∈N) ≥
W
(
(di)i∈N
)
. Conclude that
∑
i∈N cei (xi) ≥ c, as
(
(cei (xi))i∈N
)
must lie outside of
the c simplex. Now, p · c ≤ p · (∑i∈N cei (xi)) = ∑i∈N (p · cei (xi)) ≤∑ p ·xi = p ·x.
The following result is our main characterization theorem. It tells us that under our
axioms, a social welfare function reduces uncertainty aversion if and only if it is associated
with a function W which is maximized on any simplex at the vertices. Examples of such
functions W are the max function as discussed above, and the sum (utilitarian) function
W (u) =
∑
i∈N ui. Other examples include the functions W (u) =
(∑
i∈N u
p
i
)1/p
for p ≥ 1.
Theorem 6: Suppose that EU ⊆ D ⊆ CP. A social welfare function satisfies ratio-
nality, Pareto, independence, and reduction of uncertainty aversion on D if and only
if there exists a strictly monotonic and continuous W : RN+ → R, for which for each
t-simplex and each i ∈ N , (ti, 0−i) ∈ arg max∆tW such that for all (i)i∈N ∈ RN
and all (xi)N , (yi)N ∈ XN ,
(xi) 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
(yi)⇐⇒ W ((cei (xi))) ≥ W ((cei (yi))) .
Figure 2 shows the level curves of a W in the hypotheses of Theorem 6. It should be
intuitively clear that requiring W to be quasiconcave will pin down the sum of certainty
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equivalents. The following axiom contains the quasiconcavity restriction. It has the inter-
pretation that in an uncertainty-free “divide the dollar” environment, social preferences
should be “fair.”
Quasiconcavity: Let (ci)i∈N and (di)i∈N be constant allocations. Let (i)i∈N ∈
RN . Suppose (ci)i∈N 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
(di)i∈N . Then for all α ∈ [0, 1],
(αci + (1− α) di)i∈N 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
(di)i∈N .
Corollary 7: A rule 0 satisfies rationality, Pareto, independence, reduction of un-
certainty, and quasiconcavity if and only if for all (i)i∈N ∈ R and all x, y ∈ XN ,
(xi)i∈N 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
(yi)i∈N ⇐⇒
∑
i∈N
cei (xi) ≥
∑
i∈N
cei (yi) .
This corollary tells us that essentially the only “fair” SWF to reduce uncertainty aver-
sion is the one which ranks allocations according to the sum of its certainty equivalents.
We end the section with a proof of Theorem 6.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 6): First, suppose there exists a W as in the statement
of the theorem. Let
(
(i)i∈N
) ∈ CP , and let p ∈ ⋂
i∈N
P (i). Let c be a constant act. We
wish to show that for all i ∈ N , {x : x i c} ⊆
{
x : x ∗ ((i)i∈N) c}.
As a first step, we show that for all i ∈ N , the allocation (c, 0−i) ∈
arg maxPxi=cW ((cei (xi))).
Let (y1, . . . , yn) be any allocation such that
∑
yi = c. We prove that there exists a
constant allocation (d1, ..., dn) of c such that di ≥ cei (yi) for all i ∈ N . This follows as
in the proof of Proposition 5: any vector of certainty equivalents on ∆c is achievable by
a constant allocation: for a constant act di, cei (di) = di. So any (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ ∆c with∑
di = c is achieved by the constant allocation (d1, . . . , dn).
Second, by definition of p, cei (yi) = p · cei (yi) ≤ p · yi. Consequently,∑
i∈N
cei (yi) ≤
∑
i∈N
p · yi = p · c = c.
Hence there is a vector (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ ∆c with (ce1(y1), . . . , cen(yn)) ≤ (d1, . . . , dn). By
the observation above, and monotonicity of W , the constant allocation (d1, . . . , dn) satis-
fies W (y1, . . . , yn) ≤ W (d1, . . . , dn). By the hypothesis on W , W (c, 0−i) ≥ W (d1, . . . dn);
we therefore establish that (c, 0−i) ∈ arg max∆cW .
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Now, let x ∈ X and suppose that x i c. Then for all (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ XN for which∑
i∈N yi = c,
W (cei (x) , 0−i) ≥ W (c, 0−i) ≥ W (y1, . . . , yn) .
Therefore, for every allocation (y1, ..., yn) of c, (x, 0−i) 0
(
(i)i∈N
)
(yi)i∈N . By definition
of ∗ ((i)i∈N), x ∗ ((i)i∈N) c.
Conversely, suppose that 0 satisfies the axioms. W exists from Proposition 3; we
will show that the vertices of every simplex maximize W on the simplex.
Fix a strictly positive q ∈ ∆ (Ω). We shall consider a profile (i)i∈N ∈ EU with
common prior q. For j ∈ N , let
cej (x) = q · x
and for all i 6= j, choose some strictly increasing, concave, and differentiable ui : R+ → R
for which limx→0+ u′i (x) = +∞ and limx→+∞ ui (x) = 0 (the Inada conditions) for which
for all x, y ∈ X, and define i by
x i y ⇐⇒
∑
ω
q (ω)ui (x (ω)) ≥
∑
ω
q (ω)ui (y (ω)) .
Note that (i)i∈N ∈ EU and that q is a common prior.
By Proposition 5, q is a prior for ∗ ((i)i∈N), and by reduction of uncertainty
aversion, ∗ ((i)i∈N) must coincide with agent j’s preference: to see this note that
if x ∗ ((i)i∈N)c for a constant act c then q · x ≥ c as the prior q supports c; thus
x j c. Then, by reduction of uncertainty aversion, we obtain that {x : x j c} =
{x : x ∗ ((i)i∈N)c}. This implies that cej = ce∗((i)i∈N ); thus j=∗
(
(i)i∈N
)
.
For each i ∈ N , define the indirect utility function vi : ∆ (Ω)× R+ by
vi (p,m) = max
p·x≤m
cei (x) .
Define U∗((i)i∈N) : X → R by
U∗((i)i∈N) (x) = supPxi=xW
(
(cei (xi))i∈N
)
.
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Similarly, define
V∗((i)i∈N) (p,m) = maxp·x≤m
U∗((i)i∈N) (x) .
By Chipman and Moore (1979), Theorem 3.9,
V∗((i)i∈N) (p,m) = maxd∈∆(N)
W ((vi (p, dim))) .
By the Maximum Theorem, the correspondence δ : ∆ (Ω)× R+ defined by
δ (p,m) = arg max
d∈∆(N)
W ((vi (p, dim)))
is well-defined and upper semi-continuous. Define the demand correspondence x (p,m)
as those allocations which are -maximal in the set {x : p · x ≤ m}.
By Chipman and Moore (1979), Corollary 3.5,
x∗((i)i∈N) (p,m) =
⋃
d∈δ(p,m)
∑
xi (p, dim) .
Now, let p ∈ ∆ (Ω),p 6= q,p  0. Since ∗ ((i)i∈N) coincides with j, if
x ∈ x∗((i)i∈N) (p,m), then if
pω
qω
>
pω′
qω′
, xω = 0. Therefore, there exists ω for which
xω = 0. Moreover, for all i 6= j, if m > 0, xi (p,m)  0. Consequently, we conclude
that for all d ∈ δ (p,m), di = 0 for i 6= j. By upper semicontinuity of δ, conclude that
(1j, 0−j) ∈ δ (q,m). Recall that
δ (q,m) = arg max
d∈∆(N)
W
(
(vi (q, dim))i∈N
)
,
Note that for all i, vi (q, dim) = dim. Consequently (vi (q, dim))i∈N lies on ∆m. As
(1j, 0−j) ∈ δ (q,m), we therefore conclude that W (mj, 0−j) ≥ W (u), for all u ∈ ∆m.
As j was arbitrary, the proof is complete. 
4 Application: homothetic preferences
Theorem 6 gives a family of functions that reduce uncertainty aversion. We singled
out the sum of certainty equivalents based on quasiconcavity. Here we provide another
justification, one that holds for profiles of homothetic preferences.
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The maximum function in Example 4 is the most uncertainty-averse preference which
is less uncertainty averse than all individual preferences. As we remarked, this rule may
in general induce non-convex household preferences: see Figure 1(b).
Here we look at the most uncertainty averse convex preference which is less uncer-
tainty averse than all individual preferences. That is, we look for the household behavior
that reduces uncertainty aversion while remaining within the domain of uncertainty averse
preferences. We show that, for profiles of homothetic preferences, the sum of certainty
equivalent gives the most uncertainty averse convex preference that is less uncertainty
averse than members’ preferences.
In Figure 1(b), the most uncertainty averse convex household is given by the convex
hull of the two upper contour sets. If we denote the upper contour set of agent i’s
preference at c as Ui (c), the upper contour set of the household preference at c is
co
⋃
i∈N
Ui (c),
the closed convex hull of the union of the individual upper contour sets. We shall prove
this below.
Say a preference ∈ R is homothetic if for all x, y ∈ RN+ and all α > 0, x  y =⇒
αx  αy. Denote the set of homothetic preferences by H.
Example 8: Homothetic preferences are an important family of preferences in economic
analysis. In particular, a large family of such preferences are given by the CRRA multiple
priors agents, who have certainty equivalent utility representations ce : X → R given by
ce (x) =
(
min
p∈P⊆∆(Ω)
∫
Ω
[x (ω)]ρ dp (ω)
) 1
ρ
,
where ρ ≤ 1. If, given a set of such agents with indices (Pi, ρi), the condition that the
set of preferences has a common prior is equivalent to the condition that
⋂
i∈N
Pi 6= ∅.
Theorem 9: Suppose that (i)i∈N ∈ HN ∩ CP. Consider the SWF represented
by the sum of certainty equivalents. Then the household preference ∗ ((i)i∈N)
is homothetic, and is the most uncertainty averse convex preference which is less
uncertainty averse than i for all i ∈ N .
The theorem demonstrates that at any constant act, the upper contour set of the
household preference is the closed convex hull of the union of the individual upper con-
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tour sets. This means that the household preference generated by the sum of certainty
equivalents is both tractable and geometrically simple. 3
The proof demonstrates that every profile of common prior homothetic preferences
has, for each agent, a representation as: cei (x) = infy∈Ci x · y, where the common prior
p minimizes
∑
ω∈Ω y (ω) in Ci. In particular, this set Ci can be explicitly calculated as
Ci = {y : x i 1 =⇒ x · y ≥i 1} .
Using this representation, it is easy to explicitly calculate household preference: it is
given by U∗((i)i∈N) (x) = infy∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
x · y.
Example 2 Multiple priors: Suppose that for all i ∈ N , cei (x) = minp∈Pi⊆∆(Ω) p · x.
Then x ∗ ((i)i∈N) y ⇐⇒ min
p∈
⋂
Pi
p · x ≥ min
p∈
⋂
Pi
p · y. That is, a household of
risk-neutral multiple priors decision makers behaves in the aggregate as a risk neutral
decision maker whose set of priors is the intersection of the individual sets.
Example 3 CRRA expected utility maximizers: Suppose that for all i ∈ N ,
cei (x) =
(∫
Ω
[x (ω)]ρi dp (ω)
) 1
ρi for ρi ∈ [0, 1]. Then x ∗
(
(i)i∈N
)
y ⇐⇒∫
Ω
[x (ω)]maxi∈N ρi dp (ω) ≥ ∫
Ω
[y (ω)]maxi∈N ρi dp (ω).
We end this section with a proof of Theorem 9
Proof (Proof of Theorem 9): The following two lemmas are well-known, but we
reproduce them here for completeness.
Lemma 10: If ∈ H, then the certainty equivalent is a utility representation for 
which is homogeneous of degree one.
Proof: ce (x) is the the value of the constant act which is indifferent to x. Alternatively,
ce (x) = inf {c : c  x} .
To see that the certainty equivalent is homogeneous, let x ∈ X and α > 0. Then
ce (αx) = inf {αc : αc  αx}
= α inf {c : αc  αx}
= α inf {c : c  x}
= αce (x) ,
3There is a similar result in the theory of international trade, on the maximization of profits under
constant returns to scale and more than one industry. Lerner (1934) and Chipman (1966) present a
“diagrammatic” argument.
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where the second to last equality holds by homotheticity. 
Lemma 11: If u is monotone, homogeneous of degree one, and quasiconcave, then
it is concave.
Proof: Let x, y ∈ X and α ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose without loss of generality that u (y) ≥
u (x). If u (x) = 0, then by monotonicity,
u (αx+ (1− α) y) ≥ u ((1− α) y)
= (1− α)u (y) = αu (x) + (1− α)u (y) ,
verifying concavity. Otherwise, suppose u (y) > 0. Then
αu (x) + (1− α)u (y)
=
[(
α
α + (1− α) u(y)
u(x)
)
u (x) +
(1− α) u(y)
u(x)
α + (1− α) u(y)
u(x)
u
(
u (x)
u (y)
y
)]
×
[
α + (1− α) u (y)
u (x)
]
.
Note now that u (x) = u(x)
u(y)
u (y) = u
(
u(x)
u(y)
y
)
, so that by quasiconcavity,
≤ u (x)
[
α + (1− α) u (y)
u (x)
]
= αu (x) + (1− α)u (y) ,
verifying concavity. 
Let (i)i∈N ∈ HN ∩ CP . By Lemmas 10 and 11, the certainty equivalent function
cei : X → R is homogeneous and concave. Moreover, for all constant acts c, cei (c) = c.
Extend cei to all of RN by defining
ce′i (x) =
{
cei (x) if x ≥ 0
−∞ otherwise .
The function ce′i is concave, monotonic, and upper semicontinuous. Its conjugate,(
ce′i
)∗
: RN → R is defined by(
ce′i
)∗
(x) = inf
y
x · y − ce′i (x) .
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It is well-known that this function is itself concave and that there is a nonempty, closed,
convex, upper comprehensive4 set Ci ⊆ RN+ for which
(
ce′i
)∗
(x) =
{
0 if x ∈ Ci
−∞ otherwise.
}
.
Moreover,
ce′i (x) = infy∈Ci
x · y.
(See, for example, Rockafellar (1970) Theorem 12.2 and Theorem 13.2). Now, let p be
a common prior for the profile (i)i∈N . We claim that p ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci and moreover that p
lies on the boundary (has minimal sum) of each Ci. To see this, note that for each i and
each constant act c, ce′i (c) = c, so infy∈Ci
∑
ω y (ω) = 1. Now, suppose that p /∈ Ci for
some Ci. In particular, by a standard separation argument, there exists x ∈ RN+\ {0} for
which p · x < infy∈Ci y · x. Let c be a real number for which p · x < c < infy∈Ci y · x. But
then x i c, while p · x < c, contradicting the fact that p is a prior for i. Now consider
the function defined on X for which
U∗((i)i∈N) (x) = maxPxi=x
∑
cei (xi) .
Clearly, this function can also be defined on all of RN , so that
U ′∗((i)i∈N)
(x) = maxP
xi=x
∑
ce′i (xi) .
Moreover, it is easy to see, that since U ′∗((i)i∈N)
takes infinite values outside of X, for
x ∈ X,
U∗((i)i∈N) (x) = U
′
∗((i)i∈N)
(x) .
Finally, as U ′∗((i)i∈N)
is the sup-convolution of the functions
(
ce′i
)
i∈N , we conclude
that the conjugate (
U ′((i)i∈N)
)∗
(x) = inf
y
x · y − U ′∗((i)i∈N) (x)
4That is, if x ∈ C and y ≥ x, then y ∈ C.
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is given by (
U ′((i)i∈N)
)∗
(x) =
∑
N
(
ce′i (x)
)∗
=
 0 if x ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
−∞ otherwise.
 .
See Rockafellar Theorem 16.4 and Corollary 16.4.1. Consequently,
U ′∗((i)i∈N)
(x) = inf
y∈
⋂
N
Ci
〈x, y〉 .
Importantly for these arguments,
⋂
N
Ci 6= ∅, as each Ci is upper comprehensive and
contains p. Hence, we conclude that household preference ∗ ((i)i∈N) is represented
by
x ∗ ((i)i∈N) z ⇐⇒ inf
y∈
⋂
N
Ci
〈x, y〉 ≥ inf
y∈
⋂
N
Ci
〈z, y〉 ,
where for all i,
x i z ⇐⇒ inf
y∈Ci
〈x, y〉 ≥ inf
y∈Ci
〈z, y〉 .
Clearly, then, ∗ ((i)i∈N) is homothetic. To see that it is the most uncertainty averse
convex preference which is less uncertainty averse than each individual preference, let c be
a constant act. Note that p ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci and also lies on the boundary of
⋂
i∈N
Ci (it minimizes∑
y (ω) across y ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci). Consequently for any constant act c, inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
c · y = c. We
will show that for any c,{
x : x ∗ ((i)i∈N) c} = co ⋃
i∈N
{x : x i c},
which will verify the result. So first, we show that for all i ∈ N , {x : x i c} ⊆{
x : x ∗ ((i)i∈N) c}. Note that x i c implies that for all y ∈ Ci, x · y ≥ c which
implies that for all y ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci, x · y ≥ c, which implies that x ∗
(
(i)i∈N
)
c. We
therefore know that
co
⋃
i∈N
{x : x i c} ⊆
{
x : x ∗ ((i)i∈N) c}
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as ∗ ((i)i∈N) is upper semicontinuous and convex. Suppose now that there exists
w ∈ X such that w ∗ ((i)i∈N) c, and for which w /∈ co ⋃
i∈N
{x : x i c}. In particular
there exists y for which, when normalized, y · w < c ≤ y · x for all i and all x i c. We
claim that for all i ∈ N , y ∈ Ci; otherwise, there would exist a separating vector (again
nonnegative and normalized) z for which y · z < c < infy′∈Ci y′ · z. But then z i c and
y · z < c, contradicting y · x ≥ c for all x i c. Consequently, y ∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci. Therefore, inf
y∈
⋂
i∈N
Ci
y · w < c, so that c ∗ ((i)i∈N)w, a contradiction. 
5 Discussion
5.1 Related literature
There is a vast literature on risk-sharing in economics. Seminal papers discussing optimal
risk sharing include Borch (1962) and Wilson (1968) (see also Chateauneuf, Dana, and
Tallon (2000)). Under the assumption that all agents are subjective expected utility
maximizers, they determine that, under certain conditions (risk aversion or a continuum
of states) all Pareto optimal allocations can be obtained by maximizing a weighted sum of
subjective expected utilities.5 A central result of Wilson (1968) is that the risk tolerance
of household preference is the sum of risk tolerances of each individual at the optimal
household consumption.6
We present our results in a framework with general “non-expected utility” preferences.
Our theorem is general enough to apply to most decision theoretic models existing in
the literature, including (but not limited to) Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rusti-
5In particular, under these assumptions, Pareto optimal allocations satisfy what Gollier (2001) terms
the “mutuality” principle–consumption of each individual depends only on the aggregate amount in each
state. As the sum of certainty equivalents satisfies the Pareto principle, any allocation it recommends is
Pareto optimal and hence satisfies the mutuality principle.
6Gollier (2001) builds on this result, showing that if all individuals have identical preferences, then
a weighted utilitarian planner who optimizes social welfare given a constraint on average consumption
results in a less risk-averse household preference if and only if the individual risk tolerance is convex.
It should be noted that this is a fixed-profile result: the weighted utilitarian rules applied to arbitrary
subjective expected utility profiles do not typically reduce uncertainty aversion.
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chini (2006), Machina and Schmeidler (1992), Ergin and Gul (2008), Cerreia-Vioglio,
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2008), and Seo (2008). In the paper, we have
used the expression “uncertainty aversion,” instead of risk aversion, to emphasize that
we operate in a general framework of Knightian uncertainty.
The results hold when we restrict the domain to subjective expected utility prefer-
ences, preference profiles in EU : this should be clear from the statements and proofs
in Section 3. The results are also novel and interesting as results about EU ; but no
additional insights or simplifications are gained from presenting them as results about
EU .
Our work differs from previous studies concerning Knightian uncertainty aversion in
that it is normative. Most previous studies seek to explain behavioral phenomena in
markets, for example see Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994), Epstein
(2001), Rigotti and Shannon (2005) and Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008). In
contrast, we try to understand the SWF that satisfy normatively appealing axioms. In
that sense, the exercise is closer to Wilson (1968).
5.2 Conclusion
We study household preferences in the context of sharing risk and uncertainty. We are
especially interested in household preferences that are less averse to uncertainty than the
members’ individual preferences.
Arguments for reduction in uncertainty aversion are familiar in economics, and appear
as early as in Samuelson (1964), Vickrey (1964) and Arrow and Lind (1970). These
arguments are normative: a collective should behave in a less uncertainty averse way.
The arguments roughly say that less cautious collectives may reap the benefits of larger
expected gains, and mitigate the risks by risk sharing.
We introduce two additional axioms: the Pareto criterion and that certain (sure) acts
should be compared without regard for preferences over uncertainty. From the norma-
tive perspective, the Pareto criterion is obviously desirable, and the independence axiom
should be appealing. Independence may not be appealing in a descriptive setting, in
which any one agent can force a “breakdown” of negotiations; then attitudes toward un-
certainty play a role even when the “optimal” choices feature no uncertainty (Rubinstein,
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Safra, and Thomson (1992) explain how attitudes toward uncertainty are important in a
Nash bargaining context).
We characterize the household SWF which respect the Pareto criterion, compare
certain acts without regard for preferences over uncertainty, and which reduce uncertainty
aversion. The results single out the sum of certainty equivalents as the unique member
of this class which is quasiconcave over certain allocations. Quasiconcavity, in turn, is a
basic fairness requirement.7
References
Arrow, K. J., and R. C. Lind (1970): “Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public
Investment Decisions,” American Economic Review, 60(3), 364–378.
Billot, A., A. Chateauneuf, I. Gilboa, and J.-M. Tallon (2000): “Sharing
Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing,” Econometrica, 68(3), 685–694.
Borch, K. (1962): “Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market,” Econometrica, 30(3), 424–
444.
Cerreia-Vioglio, S., F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, and L. Montrucchio
(2008): “Uncertainty Averse Preferences,” Carlo Alberto Notebooks 77, Collegio Carlo
Alberto.
Chateauneuf, A., R.-A. Dana, and J.-M. Tallon (2000): “Optimal risk-sharing
rules and equilibria with Choquet-expected-utility,” Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics, 34(2), 191 – 214.
Chipman, J. S. (1966): “A Survey of the Theory of International Trade: Part 3, The
Modern Theory,” Econometrica, 34(1), 18–76.
Chipman, J. S., and J. C. Moore (1979): “On social welfare functions and the
aggregation of preferences,” Journal of Economic Theory, 21(1), 111 – 139.
7Gorman (1959) argues that actual collectives may use a convex W : he believes that utility profiles
that are not very unequal may be inherently stable. Any small advantage obtained by a group of agents
will result in a political advantage, which will then reinforce the initially small advantage. The resulting
collective will behave as if it used a convex social choice function.
22
Dana, R.-A. (2002): “On Equilibria when Agents Have Multiple Priors,” Annals of
Operations Research, 114(1-4), 105–115.
Debreu, G. (1964): “Continuity Properties of Paretian Utility,” International Economic
Review, 5(3), 285–293.
Dow, J., and S. R. d. C. Werlang (1992): “Uncertainty Aversion, Risk Aversion,
and the Optimal Choice of Portfolio,” Econometrica, 60(1), 197–204.
Epstein, L. G. (2001): “Sharing Ambiguity,” The American Economic Review, 91(2),
45–50.
Epstein, L. G., and T. Wang (1994): “Intertemporal Asset Pricing under Knightian
Uncertainty,” Econometrica, 62(2), 283–322.
Ergin, H., and F. Gul (2008): “A Theory of Subjective Compound Lotteries,” Forth-
coming, Journal of Economic Theory.
Gilboa, I., and D. Schmeidler (1989): “Maxmin expected utility with non-unique
prior,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18(2), 141 – 153.
Gollier, C. (2001): “Wealth Inequality and Asset Pricing,” Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 68(1), 181–203.
Gorman, W. M. (1959): “Are Social Indifference Curves Convex?,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 73(3), 485–496.
Klibanoff, P., M. Marinacci, and S. Mukerji (2005): “A Smooth Model of De-
cision Making under Ambiguity,” Econometrica, 73(6), 1849–1892.
Lerner, A. P. (1934): “The Diagrammatical Representation of Demand Conditions in
International Trade,” Economica, 1(3), 319–334.
Maccheroni, F., M. Marinacci, and A. Rustichini (2006): “Ambiguity Aversion,
Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences,” Econometrica, 74(6),
1447–1498.
Machina, M. J., and D. Schmeidler (1992): “A More Robust Definition of Subjec-
tive Probability,” Econometrica, 60(4), 745–780.
23
Myerson, R. B. (2004): Probability Models for Economic Decisions. Duxbury Press,
Pacific Grove, CA.
Rigotti, L., and C. Shannon (2005): “Uncertainty and Risk in Financial Markets,”
Econometrica, 73(1), 203–243.
Rigotti, L., C. Shannon, and T. Strzalecki (2008): “Subjective Beliefs and Ex-
Ante Trade,” Econometrica, 76(5), 1167–1190.
Rockafellar, R. T. (1970): Convex analysis. Princeton University Press, Princeton,
N.J.
Rubinstein, A., Z. Safra, and W. Thomson (1992): “On the Interpretation of the
Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences,”
Econometrica, 60(5), 1171–1186.
Samuelson, P. A. (1956): “Social Indifference Curves,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 70(1), 1–22.
(1964): “Discussion,” American Economic Review, 59(1), 88–96.
Schmeidler, D. (1989): “Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Addi-
tivity,” Econometrica, 57(3), 571–587.
Seo, K. (2008): “Ambiguity and Second-Order Belief,” Forthcoming, Econometrica.
Vickrey, W. (1964): “Discussion,” American Economic Review, 59(1), 88–96.
Wilson, R. (1968): “The Theory of Syndicates,” Econometrica, 36(1), 119–132.
Yaari, M. E. (1969): “Some remarks on measures of risk aversion and on their uses,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 1(3), 315 – 329.
24
